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BAR BRIEFS

MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PRACTICE AND LAW
OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
PROF. WESLEY

A.

STURGES

Yale Law School
Lawyers need no introduction to arbitration. At least they are
familiar with it in a general way as being a process whereby parties
to a dispute chose some third person to decide their particular case
instead of litigating the matter in court.
If the addition of the term "commercial" makes the term "arbitration" seem a bit strange, it may be noted that the adjective is added
merely to indicate a selected class of controversies which are submitted to arbitration. As distinguished from the arbitration of those
disputes which arise between employer and employee concerning conditions of employment, and as distinguished from the arbitration of
those disputes which arise between nations concerning what may be
termed, non-technically, as political questions, commercial arbitration
comprehends the arbitration of disputes which arise between business
men out of the various transactions which are involved in the production
and distribution of goods. In short, it embraces the arbitration of those
disputes which arise out of sales, bailments, leases, credit transactions,
agreements for business organization, such as articles of partnership,
and commercial contracts generally.
'While commercial arbitration is at least as old as our firstreported cases and lawyers are familiar with it as it appears in the many
volumes of reported court decisions, doubtless some are less acquainted
with it as it is practiced in modern American associated business.
While the law books abound in reports of arbitrations of commercial
disputes and the many legal regulations of them which have been
adjudged by the courts, it will be recalled, that almost every one of
those reported cases is the story of an arbitration of a casual dispute
between the particular parties which almost always arose out of an
isolated transaction between them. Business fnen of the past have
arbitrated their disputes with each other sometimes; their dispute has
usually arisen out of the one and only transaction which the particular
parties ever entered into. They agreed upon arbitration rather than
litigation only for the particular case. They agreed to arbitrate only
after the controversy had arisen, and oftentimes, indeed, only after
litigation in court had been commenced.
Today, as we know, business and commerce are carried on under
exceedingly intricate schemes of organization. Business men carry
a multiple membership in a network of trade associations and business
mens' organizations. As a modern business practice commercial
arbitration is to a large extent the policy and practice of these associations. It is provided for in the by-laws or articles of membership of
these associations. It has thereby become the contract of the thousands of members of these organizations. It is inserted into the great
number of standard contracts under which associated business is
conducted. It is also being provided for in the articles of membership
of the chambers of commerce, local,* state, national and international.
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At the present time more than fifty (50) national or interstate trade
associations have an arbitration clause for each of the many different
contracts of their thousands of members and maintain physical facilities
and committee management for the arbitration of any disputes which
may arise between the members of their respective associations. More
than one hundred (ioo) such associations have like facilities and
management, and although they do not use arbitration clauses in their
several contracts, they have some other provision for arbitration such
as regulations by by-laws or articles of membership to which reference
has been made. Similar development is taking place in chambers of
commerce and local business mens' associations, such as local merchants' organizations.
In this use of commercial arbitration lies the important distinction
between its modern and ancient practice. It is not resorted to in
merely isolated cases, and only after the parties have become involved
in a controversy. By contract it is fixed as a policy of trade association members with common interests. These members thereby agree
inadvance to arbitrate their business disputes which may arise out of
their future dealings.
In order to indicate the variety of business organizations which
are using commercial arbitration in this new way, I will read the
following names:
The Association of American Bottlers of Carbonated Beverages.
American Wholesale Grocers Association.
American Fruit and Vegetable Shippers Association.
Institute of American Meat Packers.
Interstate Cotton Seed Crushers Association.
The Grain Dealers National Association.
National Association of Real Estate Boards.
American Institute of Architects.
National American Wholesale Lumber Association.
American Railway Association.
New York Stock Exchange.
Motion Picture Distributors and Exhibitors of America, etc.
In addition to the associations which have actually adopted the
practice, such national organizations as the American Bankers' Association, the American Society of Certified Public Accountants and the
National Credit Men's Association have actively promoted the adoption
of commercial arbitration. In additon, the American Arbitration
Association, a New York membership corporation, with more than
1,5oo individuals, firms, business and professional men's associations
as members, serves as an executive headquarters for the movement.
It serves as a clearing-house for information on the practice; it directs
research in the subject and provides its own arbitration tribunal not
only to promote the use of arbitration of commercial disputes, but
also for instructional and experimental purposes. It also maintains
a standing national panel of arbitrators which at present numbers
more than five thousand (5,ooo) individuals. These persons are
available throughout the different parts of the United States to serve
as arbitrators in any case in which they may be chosen by the parties.
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Modern commercial arbitration, however, is not exclusively a
practice and policy of trade associations and chambers of commerce.
As business men are becoming acquainted with it in their trade
associations and as educational work which is promoted by the American Arbitration Association progresses and as lawyers become familiar
with it, arbitration clauses are being inserted into a great many
different types of contracts where the parties may have no other
common interests than their relations in the particular transaction.
This development in the modern use of commercial arbitration by
American business has taken place within the past -decade. It has
been in progress only since about 192o. A few business organizations,
however, have had a longer experience with its use; notable among
these is the Silk Association of America the Grain Dealers' National
Association, the American Spice Trade Association, the Chamber of
Commerce of the State of New York, the New York Stock Exchange,
and several of the produce exchanges throughout the country. In
some instances their experience date back prior to ioo.
In this development in the use of arbitration by modem associated
business, it is interesting to note how perhaps its chief obstacle has
been and is being met. It appears that many trade associations are
not organized to embrace the producers and distriutors, buyers and
sellers of the particular commodity. The membership of these associations is often horizontal, that is, manufacturers and distributors, buyers
and sellers of the same commodity are members of different associations. As a consequence the buyers, for example, have been reluctant
at times to agree to an arbitration of a dispute with a seller where
the arbitration was to be conducted under the regulations of the seller's
association. In so far as this has been a difficulty it has been and
is being met by the establishment of joint arbitration machinery. For
example: The Tanners' Council of America, the National Boot and
Shoe Manufacturers Association, the National Association of Shoe
Wholesalers, and the National Shoe Retailers' Association have made
such provisions. Other interallied trades which have likewise provided
joint arbitral machinery are the Dried Fruit Association of California,
New York, Chicago, and St. Louis, and the *National Canned Food
Association, the Dried Fruits Brokers' Association, and the National
Wholesale Grocers' Association.
That commercial arbitration has become extensively established
in modern associated business no one will deny. Indeed, by way of
summary, it may be said that the business trnsactions involved in the
production and distribution of more than twenty-five (25) basic commodities are entered into and carried out under arbitration agreements.
Since this development has taken place so recently and rapidly
it may be well to cite a precedent. It should be noted that the same
practice has been similarly integrated into the business and commerce
of England and the Continent for many years. I will quote the
following from the report of Mr. Samuel Rosenbaum, of the Philadelphia Bar, which was made after he had made an extensive study
of law administration in England. This report was published by the
American Judicature Society in 1916 and is as follows:
"A very large proportion of the business disputes of
England never come into the courts at all, but are adjusted
by tribunals established within the various trade associations
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and exchanges. This is especially true of the vast wholesale
distributing trades which are responsible for a great part of
the immense volume of imports and exports constantly flowing through the ports of England, and give them the commanding position they occupy towards the sea-borne trade of
the world. Disputes over the quality and condition of consignments of grain, cotton, sugar, coffee, fruit, rubber, timber,
meats, hides, seeds, fibres, fats, and countless other articles
of commerce, as well as every conceivable variety of dispute
that can arise out of a contract for sale and delivery, such
as questions of delays, quantities, freights, interpretation,
etc.-all these are passed upon by business arbitrators selected
by reason of their familiarity with the customs of the trade
and with the technical facts involved, and not submitted to juries whose ignorance would usually be equally
comprehensive.
"So firmly established is the custom of arbitration in
these lines that every contract form used by shippers, brokers,
buyers, and users of these articles contains a clause binding
the parties to submit to arbitration any dispute that might
arise out of the contract. But it is not these trades alone that
resort to arbitration. The arbitration clause will be found
in every charter-party for the hire of a ship, in every bill of
lading for goods carried by sea, in every salvage agreement,
in every policy of marine, accident or fire insurance, in every
building contract,. in every engineering contract, whether
mechanical, electrical or gas, in every lease, of property, in
every partnership or agency agreement, and in innumerable
other forms of contract. Finally, there is a well-confirmed
tradition among business men, even though there is no written
contract covering a particular dispute, to submit differences
to arbitration after they have arisen."
With this sketch of the modern development of commercial
arbitration, question naturally arises why it is becoming so popular;
what, if anything, is the trouble with the courts and court trials. I
will briefly enumerate the reasons which are most frequently assigned
for resorting to this policy of arbitration which looks, as concededly
it does, to the elimination of lawsuits in the courts.
First: The congestion of court calendars, especially in commercial centers, necessitates too long delays between the date of filing
a case and its trial. Productive capital is tied up in the meantime,
contingent liabilities must be set up which will be reported by such
agencies as Bradstret and Dun, witnesses die or move away, and bankruptcies intervene.
Second: Many a business man has complained that when, as a
party litigant, he appears at the courthouse at the time set for trial,
rarely does the case proceed promptly-even if it is not formally postponed. In the meantime his time and attention has been distracted
from his business without results and his suspense and irritation
aggravated.
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Third: The ritual of pleadings and the law of evidence sound
strange and threatening to the layman, though he is of average
intelligence.
Fourth: Appearances of arrogance on the part of some lesser
officials at the courthouse are generally irritating.
Fifth: Trial practice, of which the average business man knows
nothing, seems strange, absurd, technical and treacherous, and not
infrequently to involve bickering, bartering and compromise.
Sixth: The jury system, in so far as the system imposes upon
the parties, as it does all too often, a bootblack and a grocery clerk
to hear and decide a case concerning a complicated, technical question
arising out of a modern business transaction seems equally obsolete.
Similar inconsistency often prevails in the scheme of submitting such
a case to a judge learned in Blackstone and Kent and the statutes,
but necessarily unacquainted with the technical details of modern business transactions.
Seventh: The case becomes a matter of public information, with
possibility that its publicity will reflect upon the credit and trade
position of one or both of the parties.
Eighth: Established dockets at established courthouses scarcely
can operate to the special convenience of the particular parties.
Ninth: A lawsuit rarely restores friendly business relations between the parties litigant. In a lawsuit one beats the other in a game
which generally generates personal prejudices.
Modern commercial arbitration, on the other hand, contemplates
the choice of one or more (but ordinarily not a dozen) persons specially
qualified to decide the particular case because of their experietice and
training. There is no delay unless the parties wish it. There is no
ritual of pleading and no trial under technical rules of the law of
evidence. The parties informally tell their side of the case. Each
party in the presence of the arbitrators and of each other, crossexamines, in his own way, the adverse party and his witnesses as
he desires. The hearing is in private and at such time and place as
satisfies the convenience of the parties and arbitrators. There are no
pompous or yawning clerks. Experience also indicates that an arbitral
adjustment of a business controversy leaves the parties amenable to
further business relations with each other. Even of 'more importance,
perhaps, experience shows that the modern use of agreements in contracts or aricles of membership to arbitrate disputes which may arise
in the future induces the parties thereto to settle their own misunderstandings before they become formal controversies. In other words,
the modem practice of commercial arbitration aids to eliminate not
only litigation but also formal arbitrations.
With this summary of the modern development of commercial
arbitration and the reasons most frequently assigned for its recent
and rapid progress let us turn to some of the more important legal
questions which have affected its progress.
You recall that in Vynior's case, decided by the English courts
in 1609, Lord Coke is reported to have remarked that "a man cannot
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by his act make such authority, power or warrant not coufitermandable,
which is by the law and its own nature countermandable." With this
utterance of a remarkable truism started the Anglo-American common
law doctrine of revocability of agreements to arbitrate. You recall
that this doctrine received its most popular formula in the case of
Kill vs. Hollister, decided by the English courts in 1746, to the effect
that such agreements are against public policy and are therefore
revocable because otherwise they would "oust the courts of jurisdiction." We recall. from our common law cases that an agreement
to arbitrate is said to be revocable when either of two questions are
raised concerning them: (i) when issue is made whether a party can
sue in court notwithstanding he has made an agreement to arbitrate
the case; (2) where issue is made whether by notice he can revoke the
power of arbitrators, or prevent the effective appointment of arbitrators, provided he has given such notice before an award is rendered.
We also recall that the common law rules of our equity courts have
been the same as those of our law courts concerning revocability of
arbitration agreements and also that our equity courts will neither
order specific performance of agreements to arbitrate, nor appoint
arbitrators when a recalcitrant party refuses to do as he had agreed.
Indeed, you will recall that Section 7197 (3) of the Compiled Laws
of North Dakota expressly perpetrates this common law equity rule
by providing that "an agreement to submit a controversy to arbitration
cannot be specifically enforced." At the most, the aggrieved party
has some nominal recovery for the revocation of the agreement by an
action for damages. Lastly, we know that when, and if, the parties
perform their arbitration agreement, and an award is rendered, that
-unless the losing party voluntarily performs the award, it is necessary
for the successful party to bring a lawsuit to recover on the award.
In short, our common law and equity courts have offered little inducement or sanction for the faithful performance of agreements to arbitrate and in these cases have kept the path .to litigation wide and open.
It is true that arbitration statutes have been long standing in almost
every state of the United States. In general, however, these statutes
do not displace common law arbitrations nor the rules of law to which
we have just referred. Indeed, such is the holding of the Supreme
Court of North Dakota in the leading case of Johnsen vs Winernan
(34 North Dakota 116) as set forth in a thorough opinion written by
Mr. Justice Fisk, while chief justice of the court. 'In general, these
statutes provide that if an agreement to arbitrate is executed with the
formalities prescribed by the statute, and, in many statutes, if it is
filed in a designated court, and if the arbitral hearing is conducted
pursuant to the statute, which may regulate those proceedings in more
or less detail, then an award duly rendered according to the statute
can be entered in some court by some summary procedure such as a
motion, and judgment is required to be entered thereon and execution
issues forthwith unless cause is found to vacate or correct and modify
the award as provided in the statute. (This, you will recognize is
also a general outline of the proceedings prescribed by the twenty-one
sections of the North Dakota Arbitration Statute as set forth in Chapter 4o of the Compiled Laws.) In some states an agreement to
arbitrate which is entered into pursuant to one of these older statutes
is made irrevocable at least to the extent that an action in court cannot
be maintained on the dispute which the parties have agreed to arbitrate.
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(You may recall, however, what the situation is in this respect under
the statute in North Dakota Compiled Laws, Sec. 8346.) These older
statutes rarely, if ever, provide for the specific enforcement of an
agreement to arbitrate, and there are almost no provisions that a court
shall appoint an arbitrator if a party refuses to do so.
The most significant aspect of these older statutes, however,
especially in view of the modern practice of commercial arbitration
which we have reviewed, is that they comprehend only agreements to
arbitrate existing controversies. They do not change the common
law rules of revocability and non-enforceability of agreements to
arbitrate future disputes. This is not surprising when it is remembered
that these statutes were enacted long prior to the modern practice of
commercial arbitration by associated business.
With the modern practice comes the demand for legislation which
will abrogate the common law rules of revocability and non-enforceability of agreements to arbitrate future as well as existing disputes,
and the demand that there be a minimum of formalities required for
such agreements. Irrevocable and specifically enforceable agreements
to arbitrate future disputes are the future legal support of the policy
of preventing not only litigation but also even formal arbitrations.
It may be interesting briefly to note in passing that many trade
associations are providing substitute sanctions for their own arbitration agreements pending legislation which will abrogate the common
law rules of their revocability. For example, the National Boot and
Shoe Manufacturers Association authorize publication in its official
paper the name of any member who refuses "without justifiable cause"
to arbitrate a controversy which an adverse party has offered to
submit to arbitrators. Other associations are making membership
contingent upon willingness of the members to arbitrate. Article VI,
Section 17 of the Rules of the Grain Dealers' National Association,
provides as follows:
"Neglect or refusal to submit the subject matter of a controversy to arbitration, or failure to comply with an award
of an Arbitration Committee, shall be deemed uncommercial
conduct, and the penalty therefor shall be expulsion."
These sanctions, however, are in a sense negative. They do
almost invariably induce hesitating members to arbitrate. If, however,
the recalcitrant party will sustain the penalty, their agreements and
awards are apparently left subject to common law rules.
To meet the unanimous demands of the time the New York
legislature in' 192o enacted a new arbitration statute providing for the
irrevocability of written future disputes clauses, as well as written
agreements to arbitrate existing disputes. It also provides that such
agreements shall be specifically enforceable by motion to the court
for an 'order that a recalcitrant party proceed according to his agreement and for the appointment of an arbitrator by the court if such
party refuses to comply. Since that date the same provisions have
been enacted in New Jersey, Massachusetts, Territory of Hawaii,
Oregon, it is supposed, and in Pennsylvania, California, and Louisiana.
The United States Arbitration Act, which became effective January i,
1926, also enacts the same rules for agreements to arbitrate matters
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of dispute arising out of transactions in interstate and foreign commerce and admiralty. The United States Arbitration Act was drafted
by the Committee on Commerce Trade and Commercial Law of the
American Bar Association and was approved by the American Bar
Association. Credit for the enactment of the United States Arbitration Act is, in a large measure, due to the American Bar Association
and its Committee on Commerce Trade and Commercial Law.
Although this policy concerning future-disputes clauses as well
as agreement to arbitrate existing disputes has been enacted in these
seven states and the Territory of Hawaii and by the Congress of the
United States, a different arbitration statute has been recommended
to the state legislatures by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform Laws. This statute has been adopted in Nevada, Utah,
Wyoming and North Carolina. Like the older arbitration statutes
to which we have referred, the Commissioners' Act embraces only
written agreements to arbitrate existing disputes. Agreements to
arbitrate future disputes presumably are left subject to common law
rules of revocability and non-enforceability.
Judging by the records of the proceedings of the Commissioners,
some of them appear to have concluded that the business associations
do not desire that agreements to arbitrate future disputes shall be
made irrevocable and enforceable contrary to common law, at least
some commissioners reported to the Conference that the Chicago
Chamber of Commerce did not. Secondly, some of the Commissioners
said that they thought it was dangerous policy to provide that future
disputes agreements should be made irrevocable and enforceable specifically, for at the time the parties enter into them they do not know
what disputes may arise, and also that such agreements are "jughandled," that is, they are slipped into contract documents by one
party and the other party is caught unawares. The attitude of the
Commissioners is also significant in that they induced the American
Bar Association to approve their Act and, at least in form, to expressly
repudiate the position which it had taken concerning agreements to
arbitrate future disputes in promoting the United States Arbitration
Act.
Concerning this divergence of opinion regarding the statutory
regulation of future-disputes clauses certain observations seem free
from challenge:
(i)
Most of the trade associations desire that future-disputes
clauses as well as agreements to arbitrate existing disputes shall be
irrevocable and specifically enforceable. Their standard contracts and
their substitute sanctions of publishing members' names and providing
for expulsion from membership of members who refuse to arbitrate
have already been cited. The attitude of business men of Chicago
seems scarcely so unanimous and certain as some of the Commissioners
seem to have indicated in their proceedings. It is significant that the
following organizations from Chicago supported the promotion of
the United States Arbitration Act:
Western Fruit Jobbers Association of America, Chicago.
National Poultry, Butter and Eggs Association, Chicago.
Live Poultry & Dairy Shippers Traffic Association, Chicago.
American Fruit & Vegetable Shippers Association, Chicago.
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I will also refer you to the Year Book on Commercial Arbitration
for a record of the many local trade associations in Chicago, such,
for example, as the Dried and Canned Foods Associations of Chicago,
with its active membership of some sixty Chicago firms of wholesale
grocers, dealers and brokers in canned and dried fruits, whose members do business in Chicago under agreements to arbitrate their
future disputes.
(2)
The Commissioners of six states voted against the act.
Commissioners of twenty-three states voted in its favor. No participation is reported for Commissioners of nineteen states.
The American Bar Association had 23,450 members at the
(3)
time of its annual meeting in 1925. Eighteen hundred thirty-nine
members were present at that meeting. Of that number 175 voted in
favor of the Commissioners Act, 26 voted against it. The same relatively insignificant quorum and vote expressly repudiated the position
of their Association and the work of its Committee on Commerce,
Trade and Commercial Law in connection with the United States
Arbitration Act.
(4) It is also in point to note that the Commissioners Act is
inconsistent with the English Arbitration Act of 1889, and apparently
inconsistent with the law of almost every other country in the world,
(Brazil is excepted). It is likewise inconsistent with the following
Protocol on arbitration clauses submitted by the fourth assembly of the
League of Nations to the member nations for adoption on September
24, 1923:
"Each of the Contracting States recognizes the validity
of an agreement whether relating to existing or future differences between parties subject respectively to the jurisdiction
of different Contracting States by which the parties to a
contract agree to submit to arbitration all or any differences
that may arise in connection with such contract relating to
commercial matters or to any other matters capable .of settlement by arbitration, whether or not the arbitration is to take
place in a country to whose jurisdiction none of the parties
is subject."
(5)
The Commissioners Act is inconsistent with the judgment
of the Supreme Courts of Colorado and Washington. Both have
recently held that future disputes are at least irrevocable. They take
the position that if the practice of arbitrating is worthy there is no
reason why parties cannot contract irrevocably for the remedy.
(6)
The Commissioners Act is inconsistent with the judgment
of every American judge, who, in recent years, has expressed an
opinion concerning the common law rules of revocability of agreements
to arbitrate. They are unanimous in expressing regret for being bound
by the doctrine of stare decisis in this particular instance.
As a result of this departure in the Commissioners Act, the
American Arbitration Association has drafted and submitted to the
legislatures of the several states a substitute Uniform State Act which
is patterned after the United States Act and the new statutes of such
states as New York. It was adopted by California and Pennsylvania
in 1927 and by Louisiana during the current year.
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I will pass over the various provisions in the two classes of
arbitration statutes which govern in .more or less detail the manner
of proceeding to an arbitral hearing; such matters, for example, as
the appointment of time and place of hearing, subpoenaing of witnesses
and documents, taking depositions and postponements and adjournments of hearings. I will also omit discussion of the requisites concerning the conduct of the hearing, such, for example, as regulations
concerningquorum, hearing of counsel and receiving evidence. I will
also omit reference to the details of the two types of statutes which
govern the rendering of awards. I will also pass by the matters of
cause and procedure to vacate, and to correct or modify awards and
the procedure to enforce awards. While the two classes of statutes
vary in many particulars, their differences seem comparatively unimportant.
Instead, I will take up what is generally considered as the second
most important difference between the United States Arbitration Act
and the state statutes which are patterned after it and the Commissioners Act. Indeed, even in the statutes of the states which are
patterned after the United States and New York Acts as respects
future-disputes clauses, there is want of uniformity on the question.
You wilI recall that'it has been uniformly decided by the judges
in the common law cases that the arbitrator is empowered to decide
both the law and fact of the case under a general submission. Former
Chief Justice Fisk concisely states the rule in the case of Johnsen vs.
Wineman, to which I have referred, as follows: "The parties selected
such tribunal, and concededly submitted all matters of difference to
it, and under the law the arbitrators were vested with jurisdiction to
decide all questions of law, as well as fact."
Only if the arbitrator makes a mistake of law apparent on the
record of the submission and award, will the award be set aside in
equity. And it is not a "mistake" merely that the arbitrator decides
differently from what the court would have decided. Only if he
obviously assumes the law to be different from what it is and decides
the case on the basis that his assumption is correct-"a mistake on
his own principles"-is there a "mistake."
The Commissioners Act abrogates this common law with respect
to arbitrations had under its provisions. It provides as follows: "The
arbitratorsmay, of their own motion, and shall by the request of a party
to the arbitration:
"(a) At any stage of the proceedings submit any question of law arising in the.course of the hearing for the opinion
of the court, stating the facts upon which the question arises,
and such opinion when given shall bind the arbitrators in
making their award.
"(b) State their final award in the form of a conclusion of fact for the opinion of the court on the questions of
law. arising on the hearing."
The Commissioners Act is the only recently enacted arbitration
statute which does not embrace future disputes clauses and at the
same time provides for the reference of questions of law to a court.
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In so providing for the reference of questions of law to a court it is
also a departure from all of the older arbitration statutes in the
American states except' that of Illinois.
In order to set forth the variations from the common law rule
which are enacted by the other English and American arbitration
statutes which have been enacted, I will quote from the pertinent
sections of the several statutes.
The English Act of I89 provides that "Any . . . arbitrator may
• .. at any stage of the proceedings . . .. and shall, if so directed by
the court or a judge state in the form of a special case for the opinion
of the court any question of law arising in the course of the reference."
Under this-provision either party can require the arbitrator to refer any
question of law to the- Court, for if the arbitrator refuses to do so,
the court, on application by that party, will order the arbitrator to
do so. An English court has held that an agreement by the parties to an
arbitration clause not to make an application to have any questions
-of law referred to the court as authorized in the Act is void for it is said
to be an attempt to oust the court of jurisdiction. [28 Com. Ca. 29

(C. A.)]
Under the new Massachusetts Act "any question of law may" be
referred to a court if the arbitrator desires to do so. He is required
to do so in such case "upon the request of -al parties" to the arbitration. However, any one party may apply to the superior court to
instruct the arbitrator upon "a question of substantive law" and the
court shall do so "in its discretion."
The Pennsylvania Act provides for the use of the Uniform Declaratory judgments statute, which has been adopted in that state, as
f6llows: "The arbitrators or the parties to the arbitration, with the
approval of the arbitrators,shall have the right to apply to the court,
at any time during the arbitration proceedings, for the determination
of any legal question in accordance with the terms of the Uniform
Declaratory Judgment Act."
The. statutes of New York, New Jersey, Territory of. Hawaii,
'California and Louisiana, and the United States Arbitration Act, and
the Draft Act (submitted by the Arbitration- Association) have no
such provisions.
In connection with this last group of Statutes the question arises
whether both parties can agree to have the questions of law in their
case referred to the decision of a court or judge and still invoke the
statute. Those statutes by their terms deal with "agreements to
settle a controversy by arbitration." For the purpose of those statutes
is an agreement that questions of law shall be referred to a court and
not be finally decided by the arbitrator an agreement for "arbitration,"
or, is it merely an agreement for finding facts as in an "appraisal" or
an "assessment" of damages or the fixing of a price. The question
remains open for future decision under those statutes. Uncertainty
also remains concerning what procedure could be 'used to refer questions of law to a court under those arbitration statutes at least in
states which have not adopted a Declaratory Judgment Statute.

112
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It is clear that uniformity in arbitration legislation on this question of the arbitrator finally deciding questions of law as at common
law is seriously threatened.
The problem, it is submitted, is less a matter of what types of
questions shall or shall not be finally determined by the arbitrators in
all cases and more a problem involving the following questions:
(i) Shall an arbitration statute allow the parties expressly to agree
that their arbitrator shall finally decide all or only some classes of
questions affecting their case and still have the benefits of the Act?
(2) If both parties to an arbitration agreement desire to stipulate
that either party may have recourse to a court on any aspect of their
case, shall they be allowed to do so and still have the benefits of the
Act? (3) If their agreement to arbitrate is silent on any such recourse to the courts shall it be granted unless both parties agree thereafter to make such reference to a court? Under the Commissioners
Act, although the Arbitration agreement is silent on the matter, either
party can invoke the court on a "question of law" regardless of the
wishes of the other party.
It may also be noted that there is a further difficulty in administering a statute which depends upon a distinction between a "question
of law" and a "question of fact." Lawyers are familiar with those
categories and the basis of distinction which appear in the reformation
and rescission cases, in the pleading cases, in the evidence cases, in
the deceit cases, in the estoppel cases, in the cases involving instructions
to the jury, in the cases involving appellate review and others. Practical lawyers are also aware that what may be a "question of law" in
one case may be a "question of fact" for another. What, then, will
be a "question of law" for the Commissioners' arbitration statute or
for the arbitration statutes of Massachusetts or Pennsylvania? Will
the first question in each instance be whether the question referred to
the court is a "question of law" or a "question of fact?" And will
that question be a matter of fact or a matter of law?
Lastly, it seems to be an open question how far such statutory
provisions concerning the reference of questions of law to a court as
are contained in the Commissioners' Act are really designed to bring
an arbitral hearing within the technical rules of trial court practice.
How far are the technical rules of the law of evidence, the law rules
regulating .the competency and creditability of witnesses, the legal
rules with respect to opening and closing of cases, imposed upon
arbitrators by the Commissioners' Act in derogation of common law
rules ?.
It will be recalled that the Massachusetts Act seeks to distinguish
between "any questions of law" and "a question of substantive law."
The arbitrators are required to refer the former upon the request
of "all parties," but "a party" can require an instruction by the court
upon the latter if the court in its discretion shall give it. It is inferred
that questions of "procedural law," whatever that term may mean,
which may arise in a particular arbitral hearing, are not referable to a
court unless both parties so request.
Under the Commissioners' Act "any question of law" shall be
referred upon the request of "a party."' Indeed, the Commissioners'
Act further expressly provides that it shall be cause to vacate an award
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"where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct, in refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
evidence, pertinent and material to the controversy" (16 C). Are
questions of "sufficient cause," are questions of what is "evidence
pertinent and material," "questions of law" to be referred to a court
and taken out of the hands of the arbirators if either party so desires?
And if the court decides in the affirmative, will it decide those questions as they have been decided in cases of actions brought in court?
In short, it may be suspected that the Commissioners intended to turn
an arbitration into another type of trial court proceeding with all or
at least many of the technicalities which surround modem trial
practice. Section 9'of the Commissioners' Act adds a little more
color to this suspicion. It provides as follows:
"That no one other than a party to said arbitration, or a
person regularly employed by such party for other purposes,
or a practicing attorney-at-law, shall be permitted by the
arbitrators .. .to represent before him

. . .

any party to the

arbitration."
The following remarks by the Chairman of the Arbitration Committee, in the deliberations upon this section by the National Conference
of Comissioners on Uniform State Laws sufficiently indicate the purpose of the section:
"Mr. Britton (Ind.) : Mr. Chairman, I rise to raise the
inquiry as to whether Section 9 would prevent a certified
public accountant being called in for an expert opinion.
"Mr. O'Connell (Mass.) : That matter was discussed at our
meeting, and a public accountant there thought it would be
quite desirable that they be given that permission and other
members of the Chamber of Commerce said so, too. I would
be inclined to regard a certified public accountant, as a witness. I refuse to elevate him to the dignity of a member of
the Bar unless I have to. They are already doing a great bulk
of law busiress that ought to belong to lawyers, and I am
not one who is going to contribute to extending that field.
That's my feeling in the matter. .

.

. It was our intention to

exclude attorney in fact. In other words, the intention of
the committee was to make a practice of this kind a practice
for attorneys, unless the man himself wanted to try his own
case or had somebody in his regular employment try it for
him. In other words, we didn't want to have a school of
arbitration develop outside where they were going to handle
legal questions when they would not be competent to do so."
The Chairman seems to have forgotten for the instant that the
arbitrators are not going to handle "legal questions" under the Act;
that if the English authority is followed, even both parties cannot
effectively agree that they shall handle them; and that if they do in
fact so agree it is also open to question whether the Act will apply to
their agreement and arbitration under it.
I have given this extended consideration to these problems involving furture-disputes agreements and the reference of questions of
law to a court because they are regarded as the two most important
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issues which must be dealt with in any new legislation which may be
proposed to meet the modern developments in the practice of commercial arbitration.
Let us now briefly refer to one last topic: the position and attitude
of lawyers toward these modern developments in the practice of
commercial arbitration. We have noted that the American Bar Association drafted and promoted the adoption of the United States
Arbitration Act. During the current year the Commercial Law League
of America has formally resolved to further the enactment in each
state of any arbitration statute which shall be patterned after the
United States Arbitration Act. There is also of record the special
services of the Bar Associations of such states as New York, New
Jersey and Louisiana in procuring the enactment of the arbitration
statutes of those states. There is also the express approval of the
practice of arbitrating private disputes generally in the opinions of
the justices of the supreme courts of each of the states. More than
i,ooo prominent and experienced lawyers are enrolled on the National
Panel of Arbitrators which is maintained by the Arbitration Association. Mention has been made of the limited approval by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws of 23 states who voted to approve
the Commissioners Arbitration Act and of the 175 members of the
American Bar Association who voted to repudiate the position which
that Association had taken with respect to future-disputes clauses.
But the modern practice of commercial arbitration with its ideal of
preventing not only litigation but also formal arbitrations raises a
very practical question for each individual lawyer. It is this: What
will become of my practice-my income? It is easy to throw an
answer at this question in the form of an emotional appeal to the
high ideals of the legal profession. It is easy to mouth the proposition that the legal profession has never predicated its existence on the
philosophy that the world owes its members a living by perpetuating
opportunity for controversy in order to perpetuate litigation. But let
us pass by the philosophical and be a bit more specific.
If the ideal of -future disputes clauses as used in the modern
practice of commercial arbitration is fully.realized in that they come
into use in all business transactions and induce all business men with
understanding to get together and adjust their trouble without even
a formal arbitration is. not the practical lawyer going to figure on
these questions: Whatpercentage of my yearly net return will be lost
to me if commercial controversies no longer come. to my office for
counsel's advice or even for. arbitration? In such a condition of
affairs, will clients from whom I now. enjoy profitable retainers, find
my services unnecessary?
Obviously, there is but one answer to these questions, which is
this: That different lawyers will answer them differently.' Their
answers will vary as a-result of the different types of practice in which
they are engaged, and as a result of their different conclusions or how
fully and universally the ideal of future-disputes clauses will be realized, and also as a result of differences of opinion as to how far the
modern business man will ever think it expedient to scrap his lawyer
as a general adviser and counsellor. Obviously.these different answers
will not be arrived at merely by mathematical computations. It may
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be noted that even the Commissioners on Uniform Laws do not appear,
at least so far as their records show, to have excluded future-disputes
clauses from their act for fear that those clauses would impoverish
lawyers.
Passing from the aspects of modern commercial arbitration which
may or may not be interpreted to be threatening to the income of
lawyers, has it any aspects which are unquestionably profitable to
the practicing lawyer? With respect to disputes which have already
arisen between business men out of their commercial dealings or with
respect to a broader class of controversies embracing, in general, any
matter which may be made the subject matter of a civil case, can
arbitration be used to profitable advantage by the lawyer? I can only
remark that practicing lawyers who have informed themselves on the
practice do find that arbitration is advantageous. Cases are heard
and disposed of promptly and without delays. Fees are earned and
received accordingly. Losing counsel is scarcely required to justify
the loss of the decision, for his client has lost at the hands of an arbitrator of his own choice and his client has participated in the proceedings
in cooperation with his lawyer. Such proceedings are also generally
more satisfying to the client than a mere compromise bargained by
opposing counsel. in the office or courthouse ante-room. The parties
have an opportunity to be heard by a third person chosen by them in
reliance on his good judgment and impartiality. In short, an increasing number of lawyers today are using arbitration more and more in
a large variety of cases because it is a profitable substitute for
litigation in court and because it tends to preserve good will and confidence on the part of their clients.

